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Appellees Texaco and Getty respectfully submit this reply 
to Appellant's Answer to Appellees' Petition for Rehearing 
(hereafter "Appellants' Answer" or "Answer"). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In their Petition for Rehearing, Appellees specifically 
identified the errors in the Court's decision that need to be 
reconsidered. Gold Standard attempts to characterize these issues 
as "tangential" and "irrelevant," but a review of the opinion, 
together with Getty's Petition, makes it evident that the issues 
raised by Getty go to the heart of the Court's opinion. 
Contrary to Gold Standard's assertion, Getty does not 
argue that work product should apply to all documents created after 
a party anticipates litigation. That is not at issue here. What 
is at issue is the Court's holding that Getty did not anticipate 
litigation at the time it created the Kundert Memorandum, despite 
the contrary evidence presented to and accepted by the trial court. 
However, by treating anticipation of litigation as a pure legal 
issue, instead of the factual question that it is, the Court 
created a rule that will make it virtually impossible to protect 
any pre-litigation investigation conducted by a prudent party who 
reasonably and correctly anticipates litigation. This Court 
ignored and misstated the evidence that the sole reason Getty 
created the Kundert and Mintz memoranda was Gold Standard's 
threats. This Court should reconsider its ruling that the Kundert 
and Mintz memoranda were not created in anticipation of litigation. 
Second, the facts do not support the legal conclusion 
that Getty waived its privilege. Waiver is also an inherently 
factual question. There is a strong presumption against finding 
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of waiver, and this Court should grant considerable deference to 
the trial court's determination that Getty did not waive its 
rights. The factual record supports the trial court's finding that 
Getty did not waive work product protection. Richard Klatt, the 
person that Gold Standard claims saw Kundert's memorandum while 
employed at Getty signed a confidentiality agreement with Getty 
prior to the time he saw the document. Later, after litigation had 
commenced, Getty's trial counsel sought return of the documents as 
soon as it discovered that it was operating under a mistake of fact 
and was able to investigate the actual facts. The trial court 
considered the facts and circumstances set forth in the record in 
ruling that no waiver occurred. This Court should uphold the trial 
court's ruling on waiver. At a minimum, this Court should remand 
the matter to the trial court if it determines that the trial court 
applied an incorrect legal standard. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Court Should Reconsider the Standard of 
Review Applied in This Case. 
In its Answer, Gold Standard completely ignores prior 
rulings by this Court and argues that the Court should not pay any 
deference to the trial court's decision granting Texaco's and 
Getty's Motion for Protective Order. To review the trial court's 
decision, and hence every other discovery issue that is appealed, 
de novo would seriously burden the Court, impair its ability to 
handle its caseload and weaken trial courts' ability to manage 
effectively the cases assigned to them. 
In Jackson v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 27 Utah 2d 310, 
495 P.2d 1255 (1972), this Court expressly stated that "wide 
latitude of discretion is necessarily vested in the trial judge" 
in ruling on production of potentially privileged documents. That 
same standard and realization must be applied here. 
This Court and the Court of Appeals have repeatedly 
stated that rulings on case management issues and pre-trial 
discovery are within the sound discretion of the trial court and 
should be reversed only for a clear abuse of that discretion. Gold 
Standard seeks to impose on this Court and the Court of Appeals the 
onerous task of undertaking a de novo review of all discovery 
issues, regardless of whether there are issues of fact or whether 
the parties stipulate to the facts. 
Although Gold Standard now attempts to characterize 
this appeal as an appeal of pure legal issues, it clearly 
recognized in its opening brief to this Court that the trial 
court's decision was principally factual: 
The record on appeal in this case consists 
of the memoranda submitted by the parties, 
together with certain attachments to those 
memoranda, including portions of deposition 
transcripts and various affidavits. The 
memoranda contain numerous representations as 
to the underlying facts that in part form the 
factual backdrop necessary to understand and 
resolve the motion. The trial court 
undoubtedly relied on these assertions. 
Brief of Appellant Gold Standard, Inc. at 14 n.8 (August 28, 1989) 
(emphasis added). 
Precisely because the concept of "anticipation of 
litigation4' is factual, it must be left to the trial court to 
review the facts, evaluate the historical relationship between the 
parties to a lawsuit, and determine whether or not particular 
documents constitute work product. 
In Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 245 P.2d 224 (1952) , 
this Court reviewed an appeal from an interlocutory discovery order 
involving transcripts of interviews with witnesses to a railroad 
accident. Although the trial court in Mower did not enter findings 
of fact and there is no indication it ever considered live 
testimony, this Court reviewed the order under the same standard 
applied to general jury verdicts and concluded: 
[I]n reviewing this decision we assume 
that the trial court found the facts in accord 
with its decision in all cases where under the 
evidence it could reasonably so find. 
Id. at 227. 
Gold Standard's reliance on Diversified Equities, Inc. 
v. American Savings & Loan Ass'n, 739 P.2d 1133 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), is misplaced and it reveals the error of Gold Standard's 
argument. The parties in Diversified Equities read stipulated 
facts into the record regarding a quiet title issue. There being 
no factual dispute, the trial court ruled only as a matter of law. 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals similarly considered only the 
legal issue. In this case, the parties never stipulated to facts 
before the trial court or on appeal. A review of the statements 
of fact presented by both parties in their opening briefs on appeal 
highlights the existence and importance of factual issues in this 
matter. 
The trial court's determination that the memoranda are 
entitled to work product protect should be affirmed. At a minimum, 
the matter should be remanded to the trial court for further 
consideration in light of this Court's decision. 
II• The Court Should Reconsider its Ruling that the 
Kundert and Mintz Memoranda Were Not Prepared 
in Anticipation of Litigation. 
In its decision, this Court found that since Gold 
Standard did not expressly threaten litigation in Scott Smith's 
June, 1984 letter, Getty could not have anticipated litigation. 
Gold Standard characterizes this factual finding as a matter of law 
because that is the only way to support the Court's decision. Such 
posturing is not supportable. 
The only legal standard that could be adopted that 
would support the factual conclusion set forth by this Court is 
that a person must be expressly told they are going to be sued 
before they can anticipate litigation. This cannot be the test. 
The most often cited and perhaps most succinct articulation of the 
"anticipation of litigation1' test is that of Professors Wright and 
Miller: 
Prudent parties anticipate litigation, and 
begin preparation prior to the time suit is 
formally commenced. Thus the test should be 
whether, in light of the nature of the document 
and the factual situation in the particular 
case, the document can fairly be said to have 
been prepared or obtained because of the 
prospect of litigation. 
8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure. § 2024, at 
198 (1970) . In light of the factual situation in this case, it 
was certainly reasonable for the trial court to have concluded that 
Getty anticipated litigation after receiving attorney Robert 
McConnell's ten page accusatory letter. Yet this Court did not 
even mention that letter in its opinion. 
For work product to have any meaning prior to the time 
a lawsuit is actually filed, the legal standard must recognize that 
a party may "anticipate" litigation before a potential opponent 
expressly tells the party that he intends to sue. Yet, this 
Court's decision forecloses work product protection for nearly all 
in-house investigations: 
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In short, the Mintz and Kundert memoranda were 
not written to "assist in pending or impending 
litigation," Generally, a letter whose tone 
is "threatening" but does not state an intent 
to pursue litigation is insufficient to allow 
a party to invoke work product protection to 
protect an in-house report prompted by the 
letter. Binks Mfg. Co.. 709 F.2d at 1120. 
That rule applies here. Smith's letter 
addresses wrongs perceived by Gold Standard, 
but it does not threaten litigation. 
Slip op. at 9. 
The work product doctrine will be seriously undermined 
if a party cannot "anticipate litigation" until its potential 
opponent has expressly stated that it intends to bring a lawsuit 
without suggesting any possible alternative resolution. Business 
correspondence frequently ends on a positive or conciliatory note 
and holds out some hope for a resolution short of legal action, 
even if the bulk of the letter is very threatening and an intent 
to sue is clear from the context in which the letter is written.2 
A party receiving such a threatening letter may be reasonably 
As discussed in Getty's Petition for Rehearing, the Binks 
case is very different from the factual circumstances in this case. 
See Petition for Rehearing at 8*9. 
2 
The standard set forth by this Court could enable persons, 
by design, to get a cautious opposing company to do their 
investigation for them. The person could accuse the company of 
specific and actionable impropriety, but intentionally stop short 
of directly threatening litigation, knowing that a prudent company 
will recognize that litigation is probable and conduct an 
investigation into the allegations. The accusing person could 
later obtain a copy of any report that is created, even if company 
management testifies that it created the report in anticipation of 
litigation, since its potential opponent did not actually say that 
he or she was going to sue. This scenario leads to the same 
problem that Hickman v. Tavlor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947), addressed and 
attempted to eliminate. In Hickman, the Court was concerned that 
an adversary, by design, might be able to take advantage of his 
opponents' investigation and resulting written reports. The Court 
noted that if such reports were "open to opposing counsel on mere 
demand, much of what is now put down in writing would ramain 
unwritten." !£. at 511. The Court recognized that such a result 
would lead to "inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices." id. 
certain it is going to be sued, even if the letter stops short of 
an express statement to that effect. 
IIX
* The Waiver Issues Raised bv the Appellees in 
Points III and IV of Their Petition Warrant a 
Rehearing, 
Gold Standard seeks to discredit Getty's arguments 
regarding waiver of work product by branding Getty's reasoning as 
"unprecedented." It is Gold Standard's own argument, however, that 
is truly unprecedented. Numerous courts, including Utah courts, 
repeatedly have emphasized that a party can only waive a "known 
right."J On the other hand, Gold Standard has not cited a single 
case in any context that applies the doctrine of waiver to a party 
who was acting under a misapprehension of fact. 
As in its prior briefs, Gold Standard avoids 
addressing the issues raised by Appellees by simply asserting that 
the cases upon which appellees rely are "outside the area of 
privilege," Appellant's Answer at 8, and are therefore 
inapplicable. Knowledge of the right itself is a foundational 
prerequisite of all waiver. Privileged issues are not somehow 
uniquely exempt from such a prerequisite. 
See, e.g., Morgan v. Ouailbrook Condominium Co., 704 P.2d 
573, 578 (Utah 1985); Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 
1983); B.R. Woodward Marketing, Inc. v. Collins Food Serv., Inc., 
754 P.2d 99, 101 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
4
 Gold Standard argues that knowledge that Getty produced 
the document, not knowledge of the privileged nature of document 
itself, is the only relevant knowledge in determining waiver. That 
asrgument is incorrect. It is knowledge of the existence of the 
right itself that is an essential prerequisite to waiver. See 
Hunter v. Hunter. 669 P.2d 430, 432 (Utah 1983) ("'To constitute 
a waiver, there must be an existing right, benefit or advantage, 
a knowledge of its existence, and an intention to relinquish it.'" 
(emphasis added) (quoting American Savings & Loan Ass'n v. 
Blomouist. 21 Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968))). 
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Despite Gold Standard's attempts to characterize it as 
such, this is not an "inadvertence" case. Inadvertence concerns 
the intent to relinquish a right, and has nothing to do with 
knowledge of the existence of the right. The question of 
inadvertence presupposes that the party knows of its right, but 
through carelessness or oversight fails to protect that right. In 
this case, Getty had no predicate knowledge of its right to begin 
with. The Court should not rewrite the doctrine of waiver to 
eliminate the element of a party's knowledge of the existence of 
its right. 
Furthermore, this Court should accord considerable 
deference to the trial court in determining whether or not Getty 
waived its right. In Briaham City v. Mantua Town, 754 P.2d 1230 
(Utah Ct. App. 1988), the court stated: 
Absent a showing that [plaintiff] unequivocally 
intended to waive its right under the 
provision, we will defer to the trial court 
ruling. 
Id. at 1233. The record here fully supports the trial court's 
ruling on waiver. 
Finally, Gold Standard concedes that "a party that 
does not realize that it has disclosed work product can retrieve 
those documents [and obviously preserve work product protection] 
if it acts diligently.4' Answer at 8. Gold Standard then asserts, 
5
 Gold Standard contends that Getty did not act diligently by 
claiming that "Getty was alerted to the fact that there may have 
been attorney involvement in the creation of the Kundert Memoranda 
at Mr. Kundert's December 1987 deposition," Answer at 13. This 
representation is incorrect. Getty questioned Mr. Kundert as to 
whether he worked with any attorney in preparing the memoranda and 
Mr. Kundert stated that he had not. Opinion, p. 3. Nothing in Mr. 
Kundert's deposition suggested that the document was created in 
anticipation of litigation. 
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however, that Getty's lack of knowledge regarding the work product 
nature of the Kundert Memoranda is irrelevant. Such argument 
erroneously assumes, however, that a party can act "diligently", 
or even act at all, in seeking to retrieve documents before the 
party even knows or reasonably could know that the documents 
contain work product. 
Getty set forth in detail in its Petition the 
burdensome and unreasonable obligation the Court's opinion places 
on litigation counsel. Gold Standard's over-simplistic response 
is simply to ignore the facts and realities of this case and assert 
that in most cases trial counsel will know which documents are 
entitled to work product protection either because they will have 
generated the documents themselves or because the work product 
nature of a document will be evident on its face. Answer at 12-
13. However true Gold Standard's hypothesis may be for "most 
cases/ it certainly is in error for this case and highlights the 
factual nature of the waiver issues in this case and the importance 
of leaving factual determinations to the trial court. 
CONCLUSION 
Gold Standard's arguments regarding the purpose for 
which the Kundert and Mintz memoranda were created, maintenance of 
confidentiality, Getty's knowledge regarding disclosure, and 
Getty's timing in seeking a protective order, all depend on the 
factual record considered by the trial court. This Court erred in 
its decision by not giving deference to the trial court and by 
6
 Gold Standard's assertion that "[i]f the adversary receives 
the document and confidentiality is lost, there is a waiver," 
Answer at 9, contradicts its own concession that a party who 
inadvertently discloses work product can retrieve those documents 
if the party acts diligently. 
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overlooking material facts and incorrectly setting forth other 
facts that are critical to the issues decided by the trial court. 
Appellees respectfully request that this Court reconsider its 
September 21, 1990 decision in the this case in light of the issues 
raised by Appellees in their Petition for Rehearing. 
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